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Abstract  Starting from the often-used metaphor of the “horizon of experience” 
this article discusses three different types of intercultural hermeneutics, which 
respectively conceive hermeneutic interpretation as a widening of horizons, a 
fusion of horizons, and a dissemination of horizons. It is argued that these 
subsequent stages in the history of hermeneutics have their origin in—but are not 
fully restricted to—respectively premodern, modern and postmodern stages of 
globalization. Taking some striking moments of the encounter between Western 
and Chinese language and philosophy as example, the particular merits and flaws 
of these three types of hermeneutics are being discussed. The claim defended is 
that although these different types of hermeneutics are mutually exclusive from a 
theoretical point of view, as interpreting beings in the current era we depend on 
each of these distinct hermeneutic practices and cannot avoid living them 
simultaneously. 
 
Keywords  intercultural hermeneutics, globalization, horizon of interpretation, 
Chinese language, premodernism, modernism, postmodernism 
1  Introduction 
Globalization, the global circulation and exchange of people, ideas, habits and 
goods, is not a recent phenomenon. The fact that our ancestor Homo erectus 
started to spread from Africa to the other continents about two million years ago, 
together with its habits and Stone Age artifacts, justifies the claim that 
globalization has characterized the hominids from their very origin. Moreover, 
when we look at the history of our own species, Homo sapiens, we witness a 
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history of an increasingly accelerating pace of globalization. Already in the third 
millennium B.C. important trade links existed between Sumer and Indus Valley 
civilization. Several millenniums later, the Silk Road started to connect the 
economies and cultures of the Roman Empire, the Parthian Empire, and the Han 
dynasty. However, as the KOF Index of Globalization shows, especially in the 
last decades, due to the rapid growth of new means of transport and 
telecommunication, globalization has become a decisive phenomenon in the life 
of almost every world citizen, from the bankers in financial capitals of the world 
to the workers in the sweatshops in the developing countries.1  
Globalization has a deep impact on virtually all aspects of human life and 
culture. It not only has far reaching economical and environmental implications, 
it also affects social relationships, politics, religion, entertainment, and language, 
to mention only a few of the affected domains. This impact has always been both 
positive and negative, ranging from the global distribution of advantageous genes, 
knowledge, technologies and cultural treasures to exploitation, cultural 
assimilation, war, and the spread of infectious disease and ecological disasters.  
Globalization is also a hermeneutic challenge. The people, ideas, habits and 
goods that are being exchanged in intercultural encounters are often unfamiliar 
and have to be interpreted in order to be understood. In this article, I will analyze 
the challenges and the pitfalls of intercultural hermeneutics. Starting from the 
often-used metaphor of the (personal and cultural) “horizon of experience” I will 
discuss three different types of intercultural hermeneutics, which respectively 
conceive hermeneutic interpretation as a widening of horizons, a fusion of 
horizons, and a dissemination of horizons. I will argue that these subsequent 
stages in the history of hermeneutics have their origin in—but are not fully 
restricted to—respectively premodern, modern and postmodernstages of 
globalization. Taking some striking moments of the encounter between Western 
and Chinese language and philosophy as example, I will argue that each of these 
three types of hermeneutics has its particular merits and flaws. I will further 
argue that, although these different types of hermeneutics are mutually exclusive 
from a theoretical point of view, as interpreting beings we depend on each of 
these distinct hermeneutic practices and cannot avoid in the present era living 
them simultaneously.  
2  The Horizon of Human Experience 
In the history of hermeneutics the word “horizon” has been used often to express 
the fundamental finitude of human experience. Human beings and human 
                                                   
1 See http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
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cultures are finite, both in time and in space. They are finite in time, because they 
are characterized by a beginning and an end. Moreover, they are finite in space, 
because they inhabit only a tiny place in the vast space of the cosmos. And 
because of this finitude in time and space human experience is necessarily 
limited. We are always living within a particular horizon—spatially and 
temporally, personally and culturally, literary and metaphorically. Within this 
horizon many experiences and expressions are familiar, easily understood 
without the need for (extensive) interpretation. Other expressions are further 
removed from the center of our horizon of experiences. In these cases of 
temporal and/or spatial distance we experience unfamiliarity and strangeness, 
often accompanied by distrust and disbelief. This happens, for example, when we 
are confronted with texts that have been written centuries ago within a different 
historical horizon or with ideas, habits and traditions in cultures that strongly 
differ from ours. In these cases we experience non- and misunderstanding and we 
feel the need for interpretation and communication. It is actually at this point that 
hermeneutic practice and reflection arises, ranging from everyday hermeneutic 
practice (the visitor from a foreign country, trying to decipher the written signs in 
a language which he doesn’t master in order to find his way through the city) to 
academic, methodologically underpinned forms of systematic interpretation in 
the humanities and the social sciences.  
Of course, the horizon of personal and cultural experience is not fixed. Just as 
in the case of a person wandering through a landscape, on our travel through time 
and space our horizon of experience constantly changes with us. Individuals and 
cultures exist in time, which implies that their temporal horizon constantly 
changes. And when an individual or culture moves geographically, the spatial 
horizon changes as well, both materially and mentally. Moreover, at every 
moment in spacetime, many experiences and expressions are wholly beyond the 
spatial and/or temporal horizon of persons and cultures. Before the “discovery” 
of America, Europeans didn’t have any experience of the Native Americans, just 
like Chinese people for many centuries did not have experience of African 
culture. And at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we hardly have access 
to the horizon of experience of prehistoric man, nor for that matter, to the horizon 
of experience of twenty-third century human beings, who might by then live on 
the moon or might even have genetically modified into a different species. In 
these cases the interpreter not only has no access to the unfamiliar horizon, but 
he often will not even be aware of the existence of these possible horizons of 
experience. As Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the founding fathers of hermeneutics 
puts it: “Interpretation would be impossible if expressions of life were 
completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them” 
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(Dilthey 1914–2005, Vol. 7, p. 225).2 Hermeneutics always takes place somewhere 
in-between the extremes of complete familiarity and complete strangeness. 
Confronted with unfamiliarity and strangeness, we are in need of hermeneutical 
practices to overcome non- and misunderstanding.  
As intercultural encounters often start with non- and misunderstanding, 
hermeneutics seems to be a promising starting point for a theory of intercultural 
understanding, interpretation, and communication. However, as already indicated 
in my introductory remarks, we should realize that hermeneutics is not a fixed 
discourse. In the course of its history, both in the practice and the theory of 
hermeneutics, different types of hermeneutics have been developed. Taking the 
notion of the “horizon of experience” as my starting point, I will discuss in 
somewhat more length the three aforementioned stages of hermeneutics — 
respectively aiming at a widening, a fusion, and a dissemination of horizons — 
and connect them to premodern, modern and postmodern stages of globalization. 
3  Widening Horizons 
The first type of hermeneutics, which aims at the widening of the horizon of 
experience, has been explicated and systematically developed by nineteenth 
philosophers such as Schleiermacher and Dilthey. The history of this type of 
hermeneutics, however, is much older. It is strongly connected with the long 
tradition of the Jewish and Christian religion, more specifically with the exegesis 
of the Bible, the holy scripture. We find this type of hermeneutic practice as well 
in many other premodern or traditionalistic societies in which authoritative texts 
(or objects) play an important role. In China, for example, we could think of the 
millennia-old traditions of Confucianism and Taoism. In this kind of—often 
relatively closed—societies the truth of the authoritative texts is generally taken 
for granted. However, because of temporal distance this truth is not always easy 
accessible. The aim of hermeneutic interpretation is to disclose this truth in order 
to apply it to everyday life.   
In the beginning of the nineteenth century Schleiermacher expanded 
hermeneutics from a specialized theological exegesis to a general method of text 
interpretation. And in his unfinished Critique of Historical Reason (Kritik der 
                                                   
2 Research has shown that this famous phrase in fact is part of a series of notes Dilthey 
excerpted from Schleiermacher, and which for that reason has been omitted in the English 
translation (Dilthey 2002, p. 246, note 13). However, the quoted phrase without doubt is a 
starting point of the whole tradition of hermeneutics. Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example, 
expresses a similar view in Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode,1960): “Hermeneutical 
work is based on a polarity between familiarity and strangeness” (Gadamer 1986, p. 295; 
quoted from the English translation: Gadamer 1989a, p. 301, p. 295). 
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Historischen Vernunft, 1883−1911) Dilthey transformed hermeneutics to a 
general method for the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften). In Dilthey’s view, 
hermeneutics has its foundation in everyday human life. Human life is 
characterized by a structural nexus of lived experience (Elebnis), expression 
(Ausdruck) and understanding (Verstehen). Lived experience designates the 
subjective, first person perspective in which we experience our life. In contrast to 
the Kantian concept of experience (Erfahrung), the lived experience Dilthey is 
talking about (Erlebnis) not only is a theoretical knowing of the world, but it is 
also composed of willing and feeling (de Mul 2004, pp. 218–283).  
One way to gain access to lived experience is introspection. Introspection, 
however, has narrow limits. Not only is introspection inaccessible for other 
persons but, because of the fleeting character of lived experience, introspection is 
even for the person who has the experience not a very reliable source of 
understanding. However, often lived experiences get their expression in spoken 
and written in language, in gestures and actions, in human artifacts, buildings and 
social institutions. “An expression of lived experience,” Dilthey states, “can 
contain more of the nexus of psychic life than any introspection can catch sight 
of. It draws from depths not illuminated by consciousness” (Dilthey 1914–2005, 
Vol. 7, p. 206)3. Implicit relations, which often remain unconscious in lived 
experience, find articulation in their expressions. For that reasons, expressions 
can be called creative (Ibid., p. 220)4. Moreover, expressions are not only 
understood as psychic expressions of other people, they also have an independent 
existence and meaning of their own. A temple, law or poem does not only 
express the lived experience of its creator, but is also a “spiritual formation that 
has its own structure and lawfulness” (Ibid., p. 85)5. Finally, in understanding we 
grasp the meaning of expressions, by placing ourselves (sich Hineinversetzen) in 
the position of the other, re-creating (Nachbilden) and re-experiencing 
(Nacherleben) the lived experience. This hermeneutical nexus of lived 
experience, expression and understanding characterizes our daily lives, and as 
such constitutes the foundation of the explicated methodologies of the human 
sciences (Ibid., pp. 86–87)6. 
Although the heritage of Christian exegesis is still detectable in the emphasis 
on the disclosure of truth, Dilthey, writing in an age in which the natural sciences 
have started to dominate the worldview, interprets this truth in terms of 
objectivity. Understood as a scientific method of interpretation, hermeneutics 
                                                   
3 Quoted from the English translation: Dilthey 1985, p. 227. 
4 English translation, p. 241. 
5 Ibid., pp. 106–107. 
6 Ibid., pp. 108–109. 
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becomes a monological activity, a theoretical reconstruction of foreign horizons 
of experience in order to widen our own horizon. According to Dilthey, the final 
aim of hermeneutical understanding is to overcome the limitations of our 
individual lives by widening the horizon of experience “Understanding widens 
the horizon of our existence” (Dilthey 1914–2005, Vol. 5, p. 275).  
 
Understanding first overcomes [the] limitation of the individual lived 
experience […]. Extended to various people, creations of the human spirit, and 
communities, it widens the horizon of the individual life and, in the human 
sciences, opens up the path that leads from the common to the universal. (Ibid., 
Vol. 7, p. 141)7 
 
What kind of implications does this conception of hermeneutics has for 
intercultural hermeneutics? First of all, within this perspective intercultural 
hermeneutics consists of a theoretical reconstruction of the lived experience of 
people from other cultures, and of the meaning of their cultural expressions, such 
as texts, technical artifacts, artworks, buildings, customs and institutions. 
Intercultural interpretation would then be a monological attempt to understand 
the meaning of other cultures in order to widen one’s own (personal and cultural) 
horizon. Our own horizon of experience would be both the starting point and 
endpoint of the hermeneutic practice.  
It almost goes without saying that the widening of our cultural horizon is often 
an enriching experience, theoretically, practically, and aesthetically. It may 
expand our wisdom, and provide us with useful tools and delightful experiences. 
It may also enable us to better understand the limitations of our own culture. In 
premodern cultures, which were (and in certain parts of the world still are) 
relatively closed, traditions are mostly taken to be self-evident. After all, when 
there are no other world views or alternative political systems known, the 
existing worldview or political system is not likely to be questioned. The 
encounter with other world views or political systems can be an important 
impetus for expanding our world openness. 
However, monological hermeneutics also has its pitfalls. Dilthey sharply 
realizes that there is no such thing as an “innocent” understanding. As we always 
start from our own finite horizon, we are always tempted to solely interpret the 
other culture in terms of our own finite horizon and in doing so to reduce the 
“other” to the “same.” Moreover, in these cases the own culture is often 
conceived of as being superior to the foreign culture. The history of cultural 
encounter and globalization shows an abundance of these kinds of descriptive 
                                                   
7 Quoted from the English translation: Dilthey 2002, p. 162. 
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and normative ethnocentrism.  
An interesting example is the interpretation of the nature of Chinese script by 
Western philosophers. Most of them evaluated Chinese script entirely from 
within the horizon of phonetic, alphabetic script  (Chang 1988). John Wilkins, 
for example, an early contributor to the debate who in 1668 published “An Essay 
towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language,” was convinced that 
“there are many considerable faults” in the Chinese script:  
 
These Characters are strangely complicated and difficult as to the “Figure” of 
them. Besides the difficulty and perplexedness of these Characters, there does 
not seem to be any kind of Analogy [...] betwixt the shape of the Characters, 
and the things represented by them, as to the Affinity or Opposition betwixt 
them, nor any tolerable provision for necessary derivations. (Wilkins 1968,   
p. 450) 
 
About 150 years later, Hegel, in section 459 of his Encyclopedia of 
Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopädie der philosophische Wissenschaften, 1817) 
also represents a similar logocentrism, that often characterizes the linguistic 
ontology of the Western alphabet.  
 
[T]he development of spoken language is very closely connected with the 
habit of alphabetical writing, which is the only way in which spoken language 
acquires the determinacy and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of the 
Chinese spoken language is well-known; a mass of its words have several 
utterly different meanings, as many as ten, or even twenty, so that, in speaking, 
the distinction is made noticeable merely by stress and intensity, by speaking 
more softly or crying out. Europeans beginning to speak Chinese stumble into 
the most ridiculous misunderstandingsbefore they have mastered these absurd 
refinements of accentuation. Perfection here consists in the opposite of that 
parler sans accent which in Europe is rightly requiredfor cultivated speech. 
Owing to hieroglyphic written language, the Chinese spoken language lacks 
the objective determinacy that is gained in articulation from alphabetic writing. 
(Hegel 1969–1971, Vol. 10, p. 274)8 
 
Of course, not all Western philosophers judged as negatively about Chinese 
script as did Wilkins and Hegel. Leibniz, for example, is a clear exception. In his 
New Essays in Human Understanding (Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement 
                                                   
8 Quoted from the English translation: Hegel 2010, pp. 196−197. 
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humain, 1704) he claims that Chinese would be a good candidate for a universal 
language, just because it was not bound to oral language:  
 
Those who know the Chinese characters are right to believe that it will become 
a universal character, whose written form would be understood by all the 
world. If all peoples in the world could agree on the designation of a thing by a 
character, one people could pronounce it differently from the other. And we 
could introduce a Universal Symbolism. [...] if in place of words we used little 
diagrams which represented visible things pictorially and invisible things by 
means of the visible ones which go with them, also bringing in certain 
additional marks suitable for conveying inflections and particles. This would at 
once enable us to communicate easily with remote peoples. (Leibniz 1981,   
p. 290)9 
 
At first sight Leibniz seems to be far removed from the kind of ethnocentric 
prejudices we find in Wilkins and Hegel. However, in order to appreciate his 
positive appraisal of Chinese script, we have to take the theological- 
philosophical impetus behind his interpretation into account. Like Wilkins, 
Leibniz’s interest in Chinese was motivated by the Christian desire to develop a 
universal language. Certainly, in his case this was not so much an attempt to 
restore the primordial Adamic language that existed before the Tower of Babel, 
but rather the development of a future characteristica universalis, an “algebra” 
capable of expressing all conceptual thought, including a calculus ratiocinator, 
consisting of a set of rules for symbolic manipulation, (Eco 1993, chapter 14). 
                                                   
9 It should not surprise that Hegel, in his discussion of the merits and flaws of Chinese 
language, extensively criticizes Leibniz’s appraisal of the Chinese language: “While on the 
subject of spoken language (which is the original language), we can also mention, but here 
only in passing, written language; this is merely a further development within the particular 
province of language which enlists the help of an externally practical activity. Written 
language proceeds to the field of immediate spatial intuition, in which it takes and produces 
signs (§ 454). More precisely, hieroglyphic script designates representations with spatial 
figures, whereas alphabetical script designates sounds which are themselves already signs. 
Alphabetical writing thus consists of signs of signs, and in such a way that is analyzes the 
concrete signs of spoken language, words, into their simple elements, and designates these 
elements. Leibniz allowed himself to be misled by his intellect into believing that a complete 
written language, formed in a hieroglyphic manner—which occurs in a partial way even in 
alphabetic writing (as in our signs for numbers, the planets, the chemical substances, etc.)— 
would be very desirable as a universal written language for communication of peoples and 
especially of scholars. […] It is only a stationary spiritual culture, like the Chinese, which is 
suited by the hieroglyphic script of that people; in any case only that lesser portion of a people 
which remains in exclusive possession of spiritual culture can share in this type of written 
language (Hegel, 1969−1971, Vol. 10, pp. 272−273; quoted here from the English translation: 
Hegel 2010, pp. 195−196). 
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Nevertheless, the very idea of universal language is strongly rooted in the 
Christian idea of a universal language.10 In this sense Leibniz’s interpretation of 
Chinese remains Eurocentric.  
Because of the radical finitude of our horizon of experience, it could be argued 
that ethnocentrism can never be avoided completely. However, depending on the 
horizon of the interpreter, ethnocentrism may show different manifestations. As 
Lin Tongqi, Henry Rosemont and Roger Ames explain in their overview of the 
reception of Chinese philosophy in the West:  
 
The ethnocentric position of Western philosophy, however, differs markedly 
from its Chinese counterpart. Chinese ethnocentrism has not traditionally 
denied Western culture; it only denies its relevance and value. China’s 
ethnocentrism has generally been grounded in a perceived cultural self- 
sufficiency: China does not need the West. It’s ironical that Western 
ethnocentrism, by contrast, lies its faith in universal claims. To date, the 
opportunity to engage Chinese philosophy has been greeted by mainstream 
Western philosophers with an indifference justified by one strain of 
reductionism or another. This reduction is largely a function of Enlightenment 
assumptions which have shaped modern Western philosophy since Descartes, 
usually entailing the assertion of some universalistic, often methodological, 
index, and including as one more absolutism extreme forms of relativism 
which deny any kind of cultural commensurability. (Lin et al., 1995) 
 
Whereas Wilkins is ethnocentric in the sense that he bases his perception of 
Chinese script completely on his own prejudices, Leibniz pretends to envisage a 
neutral transcendent omega-point, but nonetheless he ends up with the imposition 
of his own particularity in the name of a universal, Christian truth.11 This 
longing for the universal is also inherent in the Diltheyan notion of the widening 
of the horizon. After all, as we already read in one of the quoted passages, this 
widening pretends to “open […] up the path that leads from the common to the 
universal.” Hermeneutics as understood by Dilthey aims to expand our 
                                                   
10 Derrida, who discusses in Of Grammatology (De la Grammatologie, 1967), Leibniz’s 
interpretation of Chinese, the notion of a universal language “always leads to an infinities 
theology and to the logos or the infinite understanding of God,” and he continues: “That is 
why, appearances to the contrary, and in spite of all seduction that it can legitimately exercise 
on our epoch, the Leibnizian project of a universal characteristic that is not essentially 
phonetic does not interrupt logocentrism in any way” (Derrida 1976, p. 78). At least, we 
should add, it does not interrupt universalism. As we will see in section 5, Derrida himself 
does claim that Chinese does radically interrupt logocentrism. 
11 See for a more extensive analysis of these two different types of ethnocentrism: Helder De 
Schutter’s “Gadamer and Interculturalism: Ethnocentrism or Authenticy” (De Schutter 2004, 
pp. 51–58). 
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knowledge of other cultures in order to achieve a Hegelian kind of universal and 
absolute knowledge. Although Dilthey, strongly influenced by the Romantic 
Movement, acknowledges that in the historical world “all understanding always 
remains partial and can never be completed” (Dilthey 1914–2005, Vol. 5,      
p. 330)12, his regulative ideal remains to expand our individual life experience 
into a global horizon, encompassing all human experience. 
4  Fusing Horizons 
In the first half of the twentieth century Heidegger and Gadamer in their 
philosophical reflection on understanding have radicalized the notion of human 
finitude and, as a consequence, have argued that widening one’s horizon of 
experience to a universal level is beyond our reach. Elaborating on Heidegger’s 
analytics of Dasein, in Truth and Method (Wahrheit and Methode, 1960), 
Gadamer develops an alternative form of hermeneutics that aims not so much at 
a widening of horizons, but rather at a fusion of horizons. 
According to Gadamer, Dilthey’s reconstructive hermeneutics falls victim of a 
positivistic desire for objectivity (Gadamer 1986, p. 241).13 In reconstructive 
hermeneutics, the interpreter is conceived of as a neutral knowing subject whose 
own finite horizon of experience is not taken into account. As a consequence, 
Dilthey became a victim of a prejudice, that equally characterizes the 
Enlightenment and the romantic movement, that one should judge without 
prejudice (Ibid., p. 281).14  According to Gadamer, the discrediting of the 
prejudice since the Enlightenment has led to a misunderstanding of the fact that 
understanding is always only possible on the basis of certain pre-understanding 
of things to be understood. Prejudices are the condition of the very possibility for 
understanding.  
One might argue, as I have done elsewhere, that Gadamer uncritically repeats 
Heidegger’s rather vicious critique of Dilthey, strongly exaggerating Dilthey’s 
objectivism (de Mul 2004, pp. 311–325; pp. 330–337). In the writings of 
Heidegger and Gadamer, Dilthey figures as the antagonist which enables them to 
promote their own alternative hermeneutical projects. But in reality Dilthey’s 
ontological analysis of the nexus of lived experience, expression and 
understanding in many respects foreshadowed (and inspired) Heidegger’s 
analytics of Dasein and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. However, the 
fact remains that Gadamer’s constructive conception of hermeneutics in some 
respects crucially differs from Dilthey’s reconstructive hermeneutics. 
                                                   
12 Quoted from the English translation: Dilthey 1996, p. 249. 
13 Quoted from the English translation: Gadamer 1989a, p. 237. 
14 Ibid., p. 277. 
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In opposition to Dilthey’s rather monological model of understanding 
Gadamer defends a dialogical model. Reaching back to Plato and Scheiermacher, 
Gadamer explicitly states that the proper model to conceptualize understanding is 
conversation (Gadamer 1991, p. 173, p. 163). In a conversation we do not aim 
primarily at a psychological reconstruction of the meaning of our conversation 
partner, but at understanding the matter under discussion.  
In addition, in opposition to Dilthey’s theoretical conception of understanding, 
Gadamer emphasizes the practical import of hermeneutics. In his view, 
hermeneutic understanding always aims at a practical application. We not just 
want to understand the interpreted matter, but we want to apply it in our own life. 
Moreover, according to Gadamer, Dilthey also lacks insight in the temporality of 
all understanding. The meaning of a text is not something objectively present, but 
something that unfolds in the history of understanding. The meaning of the work 
of Plato or Confucius cannot be reduced to the original intention of the author or 
to the lived experience of the original readers, but is a temporal process that takes 
place in the history of their interpretation. This effective history 
(Wirkungsgeschichte) is a historical movement which can never be fully 
objectified and which bears both work and interpretation (Gadamer 1986,      
p. 306).15 The effective historical consciousness is the awareness of the radical 
finitude of every individual interpretation. 
Again in opposition to Dilthey, Gadamer does not conceive the temporal or 
spatial distance between the interpreter and the text to be interpreted primarily as 
an obstacle, but rather as the very source of the productivity of understanding. 
The notion of effective history enables us to define the dialogic process of 
understanding as a fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) (Ibid., p. 311).16 
The idea of fusion expresses the fact that understanding is not a reconstruction, 
but rather a productive construction of meaning: “That is why understanding is 
not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well” (Ibid., p. 301; 
p. 296). After a successful interpretation neither the interpreter nor that which is 
interpreted is the same as before. In a certain sense the idea of the fusion of 
horizons is misleading because in effective history there are no two separate, 
closed horizons, crucial is the event that encompasses the different horizons 
(Ibid., p. 311).17  
 
Here is the tension: the play between strangeness and familiarity encountered 
in tradition is the midpoint between a distantiated object of history and 
membership of a living tradition. The true locus of hermeneutics is this 
                                                   
15 Ibid., p. 301. 
16 Ibid., p. 305. 
17 Ibid., p. 305. 
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in-between. (Ibid., p. 300)18 
 
Unlike Dilthey, Gadamer pays much attention to the role of language. For 
Gadamer, who follows Heidegger in this respect, language is the medium that 
opens up our world: “Being that can be understood is language” (Ibid., p. 478; p. 
474). Moreover, language is also the medium in which a dialogue takes place. 
For that reason, the fusion of horizons can also be understood as the attempt to 
find a common language, in order to come to a common understanding and 
agreement about something: “Every conversation presupposes a common language, 
or better, creates a common language” (Ibid., p. 384).19 With a play on words 
that easily gets lost in translation, Gadamer states:  
 
Thus people usually understand (verstehen) each other immediately, or they 
make themselves understood (verständigen sich) with a view toward reaching 
agreement (Einverständnis). Coming to an understanding (Verständigung), 
then, is always coming to an understanding about something. (Ibid., p. 183)20 
 
The partners in a conversation construct a language that did not exist prior to 
their conversation, but is developed in the dialogue. In this constructive process, 
we are “transformed into a communion, in which we do not remain what we 
were” (Ibid., p. 384).21 A genuine dialogue  
 
always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our 
own particularity but also that of the other. The concept of “horizon” suggests 
itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision that the person who is 
trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to 
look beyond what is close at hand—not in order to look away from it but to 
see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion. (Ibid., p. 310)22 
 
At first sight, Gadamer’s constructive, dialogical hermeneutics seems to be a 
more promising candidate for an intercultural hermeneutics than the 
reconstructive, monological type attributed to Dilthey. It especially seems to be 
more suitable for a modern age which has to cope with a dramatic intensification 
of cultural encounters. In Legacy of Europe (Das Erbe Europas 1989), Gadamer 
emphasizes that intercultural encounter should not be a unification that neglects 
the differences between the member states, but that we should rather learn from 
                                                   
18 Ibid., p. 295. 
19 Ibid., p. 371. 
20 Ibid., p. 180. 
21 Ibid., p. 371. 
22 Ibid., p. 304. 
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the differences:  
 
Where the goal is not (unilateral) mastery or control, we are liable to 
experience the otherness of others precisely against the backdrop of our own 
prejudgments. The highest and most elevated aim we can strive for in this 
context is to partake in the other, to share the other’s alterity […] We may then 
learn to experience otherness and human others as the “other of ourselves’’ in 
order to partake in one another. (Gadamer 1989b, p. 34) 
 
And in a conversation with the Indian political thinker Thomas Pantham he 
continues that this model of a unity in diversity should today be “extended to the 
whole world to include China, India, and also Muslim cultures. Every culture, 
every people has something distinctive to offer for the solidarity and well-being 
of humanity (Pantham 1992, p. 132). 
Although the Gadamerian project of intercultural hermeneutics sounds 
sympathetic at first sight23, it seems to pass over the difficulties that characterize 
intercultural dialogue and interpretation in practice. In the first place, Gadamer 
seems to overlook the asymmetries that often characterize intercultural 
encounters. One of the most important ones is the asymmetry of language. In 
intercultural encounters, the “conversation partners” (be it two persons, or a 
person and a text) often have different native languages. In many cases, this 
implies that in order to find or create a common language, only one of these 
languages is used in the conversation and interpretation. For example, as only 
few Westerners are able to speak or read Chinese, the dialogue between Chinese 
and Western philosophy often takes place in English, as this language has 
become the de facto international standard for intellectuals.24  
However, languages are no neutral media. They disclose, structure and 
evaluate the world differently. As “houses of Being” (Heidegger) different 
languages bring along different ontologies and, as a consequence,  different 
deontologies, too. Claiming this does not necessarily imply a strict linguistic 
determinism (as famously expressed in the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis) nor does it 
necessarily imply that no reliable translation between languages is possible at all 
(as Quine claims in his thesis of the “indeterminacy of translation” (Quine 1969)). 
                                                   
23 However, we should not forget that not all fusions of horizons are sympathetic. We could 
for example think of the fusion of the horizons of Muslim fundamentalism and of the 
terroristic movements of the seventies, such as the Rote Brigade, which lead to the violent 
Muslim terrorism of the last decade. 
24 This has also all kind of indirect effects. For example, the majority of (South-)Korean 
students who used to study Chinese as a second language, nowadays only study English as a 
second language. For that reason, nowadays they only have access to an important (Chinese) 
part of the Asian cultural heritage via English translations.  
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Languages do not so much determine what can and what cannot be said, but they 
are—at least partly25—constitutive for the way we experience the world. Thus 
the Chinese language give grounds for different beliefs and attitudes about the 
world than those we attribute to thinkers in the Indo-European tradition (Hansen 
1985). 
Let me illustrate this with an example. In his book Language and Logic in 
Ancient China Chad Hansen has advanced the thesis that the (folk) semantics of 
classical Chinese nouns are rather like those of mass-nouns (like “water” or 
“sugar” in English) than count nouns, and that for that reason ancient Chinese 
semantic theorists tend to organize the objects of the world in a mereological 
stuff-whole model of reality (Hansen 1983, 1998). In Indo-European languages, 
on the other hand, nouns typically function as count nouns. This leads to 
strikingly different ontological models of reality. 
 
With the count-noun function-pattern and one-to-one naming paradigm in 
mind, one might be encouraged and motivated to think that the world consists 
of countable self-sufficient things both at the particular level and at the 
universal level when one looks at the structure of the world. Under the 
count-noun functioning pattern in the Indo-European language, the Platonic 
one-many problem with the following presupposition seems to be quite natural: 
there is one single, self-sufficient universal entity which is common or strictly 
identical across all the particular individuals which share the same name. 
Those philosophers with this presupposition in mind have searched for such a 
single entity and tended to identify it either with one ontonic universal 
instantiated by particulars (Platonic realism or some other versions of realism 
regarding universals) or with one conceptual entity shared by minds 
(conceptualism). 
However, if the folk semantics of Chinese nouns, whether it goes with the 
collective-noun function pattern or with the mass-noun function pattern, tends 
to organize the objects basically under the part-whole relation and hence 
makes their implicit ontology have a mereological character, the classical 
Chinese philosophers who use Chinese nouns to express themselves would be 
encouraged to look at the world in terms of mereological ontology, and they 
would be discouraged from posing the Platonic one-many problem with the 
presupposition aforementioned. For the classical Chinese philosophers, the 
common names raise no Platonic one-many problem at all. That, I believe, is 
                                                   
25 In the last decades the Whorf-Sapir hypotheses has been criticized by many linguists and 
philosophers. However, recently research in the neurosciences seems—for what it’s worth— 
to offer support for a modified version of this hypothesis (Gilbert 2006). 
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why the classical Platonic one-many problem has not been consciously posed 
in the Chinese philosophical tradition and, generally speaking, the classical 
Chinese philosophers seem less interested in debating the relevant ontological 
issues. (Mou 1998)26  
 
As a consequence, when an intercultural dialogue between Chinese and Western 
philosophers takes place in English or when a Western philosopher interprets 
English translations of ancient Chinese philosophical texts, the question is 
whether this can really lead to a fusion of ontological horizons which leads to a 
“higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that 
of the other.”27 It rather seems that in these cases the one horizon is subsumed in 
the other. According to critics of Gadamer this danger is inherent in the very 
notion of effective history. It is difficult to avoid the impression that in 
Gadamer’s constructive hermeneutics effective history is assigned the role of 
Hegel’s all-encompassing Spirit. This devaluates the dialogical perspective of his 
hermeneutics: “Thus, the speculative dialogue of the effective history ultimately 
becomes a version of the speculative monologue of the dialectic” (Frank 1989). 
This problem becomes more striking if there exists an additional asymmetry 
with regard to power-relations between cultures, the desirability of cultures and 
the goals of the intercultural “dialogue.” In the forgoing I already referred to the 
fact that Western philosophers often neglect Chinese philosophy because of an 
ethnocentric belief in the superiority and/or universality of Western thinking. And 
insofar Western languages produce and deploy desired knowledge more readily 
than third world languages do, non-Western intellectuals often cannot afford to 
ignore Western culture (Asad 1986). Although changing power-relations and the 
                                                   
26 This might, for example, affect the discussion about human rights. Depending on the 
prevailing ontology these rights may be interpreted as predominantly individual or 
predominantly social rights (Hansen 1997, pp. 83–96).This is expressed in the 1993 Bangkok 
Declaration: “Recognize that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting 
bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds.” This should not prevent us from criticizing states, 
communities or individuals that violate these universal rights, but in this discussion we should 
try to avoid the kind of lecturing tone that stems from the idea that our own particularities and 
backgrounds are identical with the universal. 
27 Although Gadamer acknowledges the problem of translation, he does not seem to regard it 
as a real problem: “If we are dealing with a foreign language, the text will already be the 
object of a grammatical, linguistic interpretation, but that is only a preliminary condition. The 
real problem of understanding obviously arises when, in the endeavor to understand the 
content of what is said, the reflective question arises: how did he come to such an opinion?” 
(Gadamer 1986, p. 184; quoted from English translation: Gadamer 1989a, p. 181) 
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growing Chinese nationalism may change the nature of the intercultural dialogue 
between China and the West, at this moment there is a strong asymmetry:  
 
While Western sinologists find China to be an intriguing subject of study, they 
seldom find China a model on which the West should urgently reform itself. In 
contrast, many Chinese intellectuals perceive the ethical, technical, and 
economic outlooks of the West as real options, or even the best and only 
option, for future China. (Chew 2009, 38f.)  
 
The history of Leibniz intercultural encounter with the Yin-Yang principle 
offers a striking example of such an asymmetric “dialogue.” Within the context 
of his aforementioned quest for a universal language, Leibniz also worked on the 
construction of a mechanical calculator. However, using a decimal system this 
would require many parts. For that reason in “Explication of binary arithmetic” 
(“Explication de l’ arithmetique binaire,” 1703), Leibniz developed a binary 
system, that would enable a much simpler construction. In his essay Leibniz 
points out that his binary system shows strong similarities with the Yin-Yang 
binary code that constitutes the 64 hexagrams of the I Ching.28 And in his 
correspondence Leibniz even credits the I Ching—a book that was probably 
introduced to him by the Jesuit Claudio Grimaldi, who had spent seventeen years 
in Beijing and whom Leibniz met on a journey in Italy—as an important source 
of inspiration (Leibniz 1976–2004).. However, Leibniz claims that the true 
explanation of the hexagrams has to come from the Europeans.29 But in reality 
this “fusion of horizons” is rather an interpretation of the hexagrams from the 
perspective of the universal again shows a rather violent appropriation of the 
hexagrams from the perspective of the project of a universal language, 
                                                   
28 “What is astounding in this [binary] reckoning is that this arithmetic by 0 and 1 happens to 
contain the secret of the lines of an ancient Chinese king and philosopher named Fohy (Fu Xi), 
who is believed to have lived more than 4,000 years ago, and whom the Chinese regard as the 
founder of their empire and their sciences ...” (Leibniz 1705). 
29 “The Chinese lost the meaning of the Cova or Lineations of Fuxi, perhaps more than a 
thousand years ago, and they have written commentaries on the subject in which they have 
sought I know not what far out meanings, so that their true explanation now has to come from 
Europeans. Here is how: It was scarcely more than two years ago that I sent to Reverend 
Father Bouvet,3 the celebrated French Jesuit who lives in Peking, my method of counting by 0 
and 1, and nothing more was required to make him recognize that this was the key to the 
figures of Fuxi. Writing to me on 14 November 1701, he sent me this philosophical prince's 
grand figure, which goes up to 64, and leaves no further room to doubt the truth of our 
interpretation, such that it can be said that this Father has deciphered the enigma of Fuxi, with 
the help of what I had communicated to him. And as these figures are perhaps the most ancient 
monument of science which exists in the world, this restitution of their meaning, after such a 
great interval of time, will seem all the more curious” (Leibniz 1990–2008, Vol. 7, pp. 
226–227). 
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that—after an incubation time of many centuries—finally would lead to the 
invention of the digital, binary computer, an “informatization of the worldview” 
and a global “information age” (de Mul 1999, 2007, 2010). 
5  Disseminating Horizons 
The pitfalls of the theory and practice of the reconstructive and constructive 
projects within intercultural hermeneutics have evoked a third type of 
hermeneutics of which Jacques Derrida’s deconstructivism has been the most 
famous representative. As this “deconstructive hermeneutics” questions the very 
notions of horizon and understanding, some will hesitate to call this approach 
hermeneutic at all, or will rather call it a kind of anti-hermeneutics. Derrida 
radicalizes Friedrich Schleiermacher’s thesis that hermeneutics is based on a 
fundamental non-understanding (Schleiermacher 1985, p. 1271). According to 
Schleiermacher, no word has a fixed meaning. Its meaning depends on the 
context or horizon in which it appears. However, such a horizon can be extended 
on all sides and without end. For Schleiermacher this means that hermeneutic 
understanding is an infinite task. Derrida takes this insight one step further and 
argues that in every demarcation of meaning a decision is made about something 
that is fundamentally undecidable.   
Furthermore, every word can be taken out of its “original” context and 
transposed to another. By quoting a word or a longer piece of text in another 
context—Derrida uses the image of “grafting” a word on another “branch” 
—new meanings are continuously produced:  
 
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense of 
this proposition), as a small or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation 
marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender infinitely 
new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that 
the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only 
contexts without any center of absolute anchoring. This citationality, 
duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is not an accident or an 
anomaly, but is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could no longer 
even have a so-called “normal” functioning. (Derrida 1972a, pp. 320–321)30 
 
The aim of Derrida’s deconstructive hermeneutics is not to disclose the 
abundance of meaning that every text is supposed to have, but rather to question 
the very possibility of hermeneutic understanding:   
                                                   
30 Quoted from English translation: Derrida 1982, p. 381. 
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The semantic horizon which habitually governs the notion of communication 
is exceeded or punctured by the intervention of writing, that is of a 
dissemination which cannot be reduced to a polysemy. Writing is read, and “in 
the last analysis” does not give rise to a hermeneutic deciphering, to the 
decoding of a meaning or truth. (Derrida 1972b, p. 294; see also 1972a,      
p. 39231) 
 
Continuing to build on the image of the horizon that is also employed by 
Derrida in the last quote, we might argue that when he sets dissemination against 
polysemy, Derrida is not aiming at a broadening of horizons (as with Dilthey), or 
at a fusion of horizons (as with Gadamer), but at a dissemination of horizons. 
And instead of a monologue or a dialogue, Derrida seems to promote an 
anarchistic kind of polylogue. 
Whereas Dilthey’s reconstructive hermeneutics is theoretical and Gadamer’s 
constructive hermeneutics practical, the aim of Derrida’s deconstructive 
hermeneutics is rather an endless aesthetic play with meaning. However, this 
play is far from devoid of seriousness. For Derrida, the refusal to assign a 
definite meaning to a text or to the utterance of a conversation partner is an act of 
respect for the “otherness of the other.” If every hermeneutic act of 
understanding unavoidably results in a violent act of appropriation of the other, 
Derrida defends—to use an expression of Éduard Glissant—“the right of 
opacity” (de Schutter 2004; Glissant 1997, p. 29).We find it expressed in the 
resistance of some groups to join the often violent “conversation of mankind” 
that characterize the process of globalization.32 But Derrida’s project is not a 
defensive one. His deconstruction embarks on a “letting arrive the adventure or 
happening of the complete other” (Derrida 1987, p. 61). As such, Derrida takes 
his deconstructive hermeneutics to include a radical critique of ethnocentricism.  
How difficult the predicaments of this endeavor are becomes clear in Derrida’s 
own encounter with Chinese script in Of Grammatology (De la grammatologie, 
1967). In this work Derrida aims at a deconstruction of the logo-centrism that 
characterizes Western metaphysics from Plato and Aristotle on. One of the most 
striking aspects of logocentrism is phonocentrism: the idea that the truth of the 
logos is only to be found in speech and that writing is secondary and subordinate. 
In the foregoing we already touched upon this phonocentrism in the discussion of 
Hegel’s critique of Chinese script. Although alphabetic writing is inferior to 
speech, according to Hegel its phonetic form at least endows it with an evident 
                                                   
31 English translation: Derrida 1982, p. 329. 
32 Derrida also followed this strategy in the famous “debate” with Gadamer in Paris in 1981. 
Whereas Gadamer tried to involve Derrida in a conversation, Derrida intentionally avoided 
Gadamer’s attempt to get at mutual understanding (Michelfelder 1989). 
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similarity with vocal language. For that reason alphabetic writing is superior to 
Chinese script, because this lacks the intimate relationship to speech completely.33 
Derrida criticizes the hierarchical dichotomies that characterize Western 
metaphysics, such as inside/outside, self/other, man/woman, and speech/writing. 
This is the reason that in his view both Hegel’s radical rejection of Chinese 
writing and Leibniz’s hyperbolic admiration as well are products of the 
ethnographic scorn that haunts Western metaphysics (cf. Chang 1998, see also 
endnote 5; Derrida 1976, p. 78). Derrida aims at undermining hierarchical 
dichotomies by deconstructing their opposition.  
For example, the opposition between self and other turns out to be a very 
problematic one when we look somewhat closer at cultural differences. Every 
culture derives many elements from other cultures. For example, when the tulip 
is presented as a traditional Dutch flower, it is usually forgotten that this Dutch 
icon comes from Turkey and Afghanistan. And when pasta is worldwide regarded 
as typical Italian food, we should remember that several centuries ago it was 
brought from China to Italy by Marco Polo. What we can learn from these 
examples is that cultures are no homogeneous, self-contained and unchanging 
wholes of traditions, ideas, goods, and norms. When elements are transferred 
from one culture to another, these elements become grafted into a new cultural 
context and acquire new meaning. For those who “quote” the inherently citable 
elements of other cultures, these “foreign” elements soon become their “own.” 
Italians certainly regard pasta as part of their cultural identity, but we have to 
keep in mind that pasta owes its Italian-ness to the very differences that exist 
between the role it plays in the Chinese and the Italian cuisine and culture. Thus, 
we could even say that every culture is already intercultural in itself. The 
“origin” of any culture always lies “elsewhere.” The play of identity and 
difference is not possible without the dimension of the in-between.  
                                                   
33 “Alphabetic writing is in and for itself the more intelligent form; in it the word, the 
worthiest mode, peculiar to the intelligence, of expressing its representations, is brought to 
consciousness and made an object of reflexion. In this preoccupation of intelligence with the 
word, the word is analyzed, i.e. this sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the 
primal gestures of articulation); these are the sensory component of speech, brought to the 
form of universality, and at the same time acquiring in this elementary manner complete 
determinacy and purity. Alphabetic writing thereby also retains the advantage of spoken 
language, that in written as in spoken representations have genuine names; the name is the 
simple sign for the genuine, i.e. simple representation, not resolved into its determinations and 
compounded out of them. Hieroglyphic language arises not not from the direct analysis of 
sensory signs, like alphabetic writing, but from preliminary analysis of representations. This 
then readily provokesthe thought that all representations could be reduced to their elements, to 
simple logical determinations, so that from the elementary signs chosen for these (as, in the 
case of the Chinese kua, the simple straight stroke, and the stroke broken into two parts) 
hieroglyphic language would be generated by their composition.” (Hegel, 1969−1971, Vol. 10, 
p. 275; quoted from the English translation: Hegel 2010, p. 197). 
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However, it is surprising that in Of Grammatology Derrida himself seems to 
revert to the same hierarchical opposition that he aims to deconstruct. In his 
crusade against logocentrism Derrida—not unlike Leibniz—cannot resist a 
hyperbolical admiration of the Chinese script, which he calls “the testimony of a 
powerful movement of civilization developing outside of all logocentrism” (le 
témoignage d'un puissant mouvement de civilisation se développant hors de tout 
logocentrisme) (Derrida 1976, p. 90, italics JdM). Probably it is his fascination 
for “the otherness of the other” that seduces him to this radical exclusion from 
logocentrism. It not only completely overlooks the fact that Chinese writing has a 
large number of phonetic elements, but also that phonocentrism is far from 
absent among classical and modern linguists in China.34 For that reason Sean 
Meighoo’s extensive analysis of Derrida’s concept of Chinese writing arrives at a 
devastating conclusion: “Derrida’s own concept of Chinese writing functions as a 
sort of Euro-American “hallucination,” a hallucination that he shares […] surely 
with Leibniz himself. This concept of Chinese writing remains a “domestic 
representation,” harboring a profound “misunderstanding” of Chinese language, 
culture, and society” (Meighoo 2008). 
Although we may not generalize this example, the fact that even a 
deconstructive philosopher like Derrida in this case does not succeed in avoiding 
(an inverse) ethnocentrism, seems to force us to lower our expectations 
concerning the possibility of a flawless intercultural dialogue and hermeneutics. 
Should we add to Schleiermacher’s thesis that all interpretation is based on 
non-understanding that it also inevitably continues in non-understanding, and 
conclude that intercultural encounter in the age of globalization is doomed to fail 
or even to result in a “clash of cultures” (Huntington 1996), at least on the level 
of understanding? Or will the postmodern stage of globalization we have entered 
also disclose a new and not yet to be foreseen stage in intercultural dialogue and 
hermeneutics? 
                                                   
34 As Chang Han-Liang states in “Hallucinating the Other: Derridean Fantasies of Chinese 
Script”: “The Chinese version of logocentrism can be glimpsed from the following statements 
of the sixth-century Liu Hsieh, the first and probably the only systematic literary critic in 
classical and medieval China: ‘When the mind is at work, speech is uttered. When speech is 
uttered, writing is produced. The Tao inspires writing and writing illuminates the Tao. What in 
mind is idea when expressed in speech is poetry. Isn’t this what we are doing when dashing off 
writing to record reality?’ […] Under the tyranny of logocentrism, writing is rendered as 
secondary and subordinate. In Aristotle’s celebrated phrasing which opens On Interpretation: 
‘Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of 
spoken words’ […] This formulation, which Derrida criticizes in The Margins of Philosophy as 
psychologism, is almost a verbatim paraphrase of Liu Hsieh: ‘When the mind is at work, 
speech is uttered. When speech is uttered, writing is produced.’ Thus in both China and the 
West, at least in the Aristotelian and Confucian traditions, the category of writing is inscribed 
only in relation to speech and to the subject of writing” (Chang 1988, p. 6). 
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6  Kaleidoscoping Horizons 
In the preceding discussion of the reconstructive, constructive, and deconstructive 
hermeneutics, I have stressed the crucial significance of the concept of 
“horizon.” In each of these conceptions of intercultural understanding, the 
existence of different (cultural) horizons constitutes the condition of the necessity 
and the possibility of understanding. Even in the case of Derrida the 
dissemination of horizons presupposes their existence. As such horizons tend to 
function as prison houses, which inevitably force their prisoners into an 
ethnocentric position. This seems to be an inseparable aspect of the finitude of 
the human life form.  
However, this does not mean that ethnocentrism is a thing that we should 
demonize as such. A (unavoidably ethnocentric) horizon is not only an obstacle, 
but also the very condition of the possibility of understanding and communication. 
It is a meaningful nexus without which there would be no understanding or 
communication at all. And as we have seen, each type of intercultural 
hermeneutics has its merits. Broadening our horizon by reconstructing and 
incorporation of other horizons of experience enriches our lives. In the fusion of 
horizons we construct new knowledge and develop new practices. Deconstructing 
existing horizons may create openness for other possibilities. And even when 
intercultural understanding and communication results in ethnocentric 
misunderstanding of the other or in miscommunication, in many cases this might 
be preferable to the experience of complete strangeness and sheer non- 
understanding of the other. Moreover, misunderstanding is often very productive. 
Without a doubt not all misunderstandings are desirable. They may easily lead to 
all kinds of tensions and conflicts. However, these tensions and conflicts are an 
integral part of the “motor” that drives human history.  
Moreover, we should not exaggerate the clash of horizons. As we already 
noticed, the concept of horizon on closer inspection is rather monolithic. In 
reality we exist in a multitude of horizons: ethnic, linguistic, gender, sexual, 
religious, political, philosophical, emotional, social, economical, scientific, just 
to mention a few of the countless horizons that surround and constitute us. Some 
of the horizons are quite narrow and idiosyncratic, others are almost universal. 
Understanding a conversation in a foreign language may be impossible, whereas 
it is not difficult to understand the grief of parents in that foreign culture 
mourning about their dead child. And although there may be a wide cultural gap 
between a Saudi Arabian woman and a woman from Canada, living as women in 
a world that is often dominated by men, they may share a specific horizon of 
experience at the same time. And the horizons of experience of a cab driver in 
Beijing and one in Berlin may have more in common than those of the Beijing 
cab driver and a Beijing university professor.  
Horizons of Hermeneutics: Intercultural Hermeneutics in a Globalizing World 
 
649 
Moreover, in the postmodern stage of globalization, the circulation and 
exchange of people, ideas, habits and goods has reached a momentum in which 
the conception of horizons as monolithic wholes has become fully obsolete. 
Millions of migrants, workers, students and tourists are moving between cultures. 
Locally produced goods are being distributed globally. Ideas circulate through 
global computer networks. A growing number of the world inhabitants are 
becoming hybrid subjects that belong to a variety of different horizons These 
“true hybrids” are in-between many different horizons (Bauman 1991, p. 58). 
This kind of hybrid subjectivity is typical for postmodern globalization.  
Although globalization is as old as humankind, premodern cultures are often 
monocultural in the sense that they have a relative lack of means of transport and 
communication, and as a consequence, often have a slow pace of circulation and 
exchange. Modern cultures, on the other hand, mostly are multicultural. In 
modern societies, many different cultures are living next to each other in the 
same place. In modern cultures, especially newcomers are often considered as 
strangers, physically close but socially and culturally distant (Marotta 2009). 
Postmodern globalization, structured by a variety of information and 
communication networks, is characterized by a situation where we can be 
physically distant, but socially and culturally close. We are intercultural because 
we are part of the processes of constant circulation and exchange.35 
In the age of postmodern globalization personal and cultural horizons are 
increasingly becoming kaleidoscopic. Postmodern culture has the character of a 
database that constantly combines, recombines and decombines the elements of 
the human “mentome” and global cultural “meme pool” (de Mul 2009). In this 
kaleidoscopic experience the distinction between the self and the other becomes 
increasingly blurred and ambiguous. The more, because in our present world, 
premodern, modern and postmodern horizons simultaneously exist and interact in 
many parts of the world. 
This complex and often confusing situation offers a new challenge for 
intercultural hermeneutics. The hermeneutic reconstruction, construction and 
deconstruction of horizons without a doubt will continue. Although they are, in 
the strictest sense, irreconcilable notions and practices of interpretation, we 
simultaneously live them, because in the practice of interpreting each other they 
continuously presuppose each other. However, the kaleidoscoping of our 
horizons will force us to develop new strategies for understanding and 
                                                   
35 “Why the issue of interculturalism rather than multiculturalism? Multiculturalism is a 
policy based on the notion of personal autonomy. Interculturalism, in contrast, recognizes that 
in a society of mixed ethnicities, cultures act in multiple directions. Host or majority cultures 
are influenced by immigrant or minority cultures and vice versa. Multiculturalism tends to 
preserve a cultural heritage, while interculturalism acknowledges and enables cultures to have 
currency, to be exchanged, to circulate, to be modified and evolve” (Powell 2004, p. 1). 
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interpreting each other and ourselves. 
Because of the radical finiteness of our (present) life form, it is unlikely that 
will be able to overcome ethnocentrism. However, what we may hope to achieve 
in intercultural hermeneutics (or at least cherish as its regulative ideal), is a 
“reflective ethnocentrism.”36 Just like we may hope to achieve a “reflective 
anachronism” in our studies of cultures of the past. Without doubt this is a never- 
ending task for hermeneutics. But having no end also means having a future.  
 
Afterimage 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Xu Bing. Book from the Sky, 1987−1991. Mixed Media Installation. The National 
Gallery of Canada, Ottawa 
 
 
 
Fig. 2  Xu Bing. Square Word Calligraphy,       Fig. 3  Xu Bing. Square Word 
2005. New English (Square Word) Calligraphy Calligraphy, 2005 
                                                   
36 I owe this phrase to Karl-Heinz Pohl, who used it during his lecture “Chinese and Western 
Values: Reflections on the Methodology of a Cross-Cultural Dialogue” at the conference 
Traditions and Contemporary World, Beijing Normal University, December 12–13, 2009. 
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 Fig. 4  Xu Bing. Book from         Fig. 5  Xu Bing. Novel, Book from the Earth, 2008 
the Earth, 2008 
 
It goes without saying that reflection on intercultural hermeneutics is not an 
exclusive privilege for philosophers. It also is a recurring theme in contemporary 
art. In the context of the foregoing analysis the work of the Chinese artist Xu 
Bing (1956) is especially interesting. Xu, who was trained in the 70s at Central  
Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing in the then still dominant tradition of social 
realism, attracted international attention with his project Book from the Sky 
(1987–1991), which consists of thousands pseudo Chinese characters, forged by 
the artist and carefully hand-carved into wood blocks, which are used as movable 
types to print volumes and scrolls, which are displayed laid out on the floor and 
hung from the ceiling, constituting impressive mixed media installations (see  
Fig. 1). Though this work has been interpreted convincingly as a plea for 
autonomous art and/or a subversion of the socialist ideology, by showing that it is 
void of content (cf. Peng 2009), it also seems to comprehend a more general 
reflection on the unfathomable character of human expression, which leads to a 
fundamental non-understanding. Xu seems to radicalize experience of non- 
understanding by creating Chinese characters that, although at first sight they 
look familiar (they express Chinese-ness), turn out to be completely unreadable, 
not only for non-Chinese readers, but for Chinese readers as well. The vast 
planes of text seem to convey ancient wisdom, but are in fact fully unintelligible. 
They constitute an impenetrable horizon of experience, which radically defy 
hermeneutic understanding. 
In a subsequent project, Square Word Calligraphy (1994–1996), Xu Bing 
seems to express a more optimistic vision on understanding by investigating the 
possibility of a fusion of the horizons of Chinese and English. Just like Book 
from the Sky, Square Word Calligraphy makes the impression to consist of 
Chinese characters, whereas in fact they are not (see Figs. 2 and 3). In this case, 
however, the “characters” are composed of English words, arranged in a way that 
gives them a Chinese look. In that sense they are a fusion of two linguistic 
horizons. The project seems to be a humorous comment or critique on the 
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asymmetry that, as I have argued in the foregoing, often characterize the “fusion” 
of horizons (for example when the discussion between a Chinese and an English 
person takes place in English). In order to communicate with Square Word 
Calligraphy, the Chinese user still has to learn English, but the English speaker 
at least has to become familiar with some of the features of Chinese writing. As 
Xu Bing explains, the effect is an experience of “in between”: 
 
Square Word Calligraphy […] exists on the borderline between two 
completely different cultures. To viewers from these two cultures, the 
characters present equal points of familiarity and of strangeness. A Chinese 
person recognizes the characters as familiar faces but can’t figure out exactly 
who they are. To a Westerner, they first appear as mysterious glyphs from 
Asian culture, yet ultimately they can be read and understood […] The 
absurdity of Square Word Calligraphy is that it takes two different words from 
two completely unrelated language systems and fuses them together into one 
entity. If you use existing concepts of Chinese or English to try and read or 
interpret these characters, you won’t succeed. This total disconnection between 
outer appearance and inner substance places people in a kind of shifting 
cultural position, an uncertain transitional state. (Ibid., pp. 4–5) 
 
In the recent project Book from the Earth (2008), Xu Bing seems to give an 
ironic comment on the Eurocentric obsession for a universal language. It consists 
of a computer program, which can translate Chinese and English into a universal 
icon language, inspired by the type of icons that can be found on international 
airports (Fig. 4). The computer program enables Chinese and English persons 
who don’t speak each other’s language to communicate in a visual manner. 
Although Xu Bing in interviews claims that “the program is meant to enable 
communication regardless of the user’s cultural background or level of 
education” and even states that “the continuation of this trend is humanity’s 
future” (Ibid., p. 7), at the same time the work seems to contain an ironic 
reflection on the ambition to develop a transparent, flawless language. Whereas 
elementary messages and stories can be successfully communicated by The Book 
from Earth, Xu Bing’s attempts to convey more complex meanings in works such 
as Novel (Fig. 5) make us not only realize the richness of our finite, natural 
languages, but at the same time demarcates the unsurpassable boundaries of any 
intercultural dialogue and polylogue.  
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otherwise indicated, the English translations of the quotes in this article are mine. 
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